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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
definitions of "past-due debts" include almost any situation where the
check passes without the passer's simultaneous receipt of an article. Ex-
clusion of past-due debts unduly restricts the operation of the statute.
A final proposal relates to the prevention of abuse of the criminal
process by anxious creditors. First, restitution should not be a defense.
Second, there should be some penalty available for those victims who avail
themselves of the efforts of the prosecutor's office and the police depart-
ment and later drop the charges. These suggestions, along with the pro-
posal that the victim give notice of dishonor, would more adequately
insure that only those victims who seriously seek to impose a criminal
penalty, as opposed to those who seek to hasten payment, will initiate
an action.
Insufficient funds checks present as substantial a problem to the
prosecutor as they do to the commercial society. Nevertheless, while "bad
checks" constitute nuisances to society, a viable criminal solution to the
problem must be tempered by the basic constitutional rights of every
citizen. An effective blend of these factors is possible only through a rea-
sonable approach to the practical problems of insufficient funds prose-
cutions.
JAMES E. CROWE, JR.
MISSOURI CORPORATION STATUTES-
NEEDED CHANGES FOR CLOSE CORPORATIONS
I. INTRODUCION
The Uniform Partnership Act allows partners to fashion their own
management and organizational structure to meet their individual needs.1
Partners may agree on who will manage the business and who will be em-
ployed at what salary. Partners usually work together daily, and are aware
of the skills and reliability of their fellow partners. Each partner may have
a definite idea about the role he wishes to play in the business, and he
may want to make this role a condition to his investment. Partners can
give the business the desired measure of stability by agreeing as to when
and upon what terms the partnership will be dissolved. In summary,
partners have full freedom to contract as to the operation of their business.
Shareholders in a dose corporation may have the same characteristics
of mutual trust and close association as partners. In many cases, the share-
holders will have operated as a partnership for many years. In the minds
of the shareholders, the change to corporate form may be no more than
a formality, represented by an inscrutable document on file in their lawyer's
office. The nature of the association between the participants remains
unchanged, and the shareholders may desire to tailor the structure of
their business to their personal needs as they did in the partnership. The
1. See § 358.180, RSMo 1969, which makes it dear that the provisions of
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obstacle to such agreements, when the parties operate as a corporation,
is the "corporate norm." A zealous regard for the letter of the law has
traditionally caused many courts to require rigid adherence to the struc-
tural and organizational arrangements set out in the corporate statutes.
This structure has a Jeffersonian ring, embodying majority rule, repre-
sentational role of directors and officers, and separation of power between
the shareholders and directors. 2 While this structure serves well for large,
publicly held corporations, where the dispersion of ownership requires
a separation of ownership and management, it is poorly suited to the
intimate associations that often characterize close corporations.8 Professor
Latty has observed that "[a]ll this structure of representative government
in the typical corporation law is about as appropriate for a two-man get-
together as Robert's Rules of Order." 4
The landmark case espousing the doctrine of "corporate norms" is
Jackson v. Hooper.5 Jackson and Hooper purchased all the stock in a
corporation and agreed that they would run it like a partnership and
share control. There were five directors, but it was agreed that three of
these would be dummy directors, leaving Jackson and Hooper as the only
active directors. Contrary to the agreement, Jackson teamed up with the
dummy directors and passed by-law provisions that deprived Hooper of
his equal control. Hooper sued to enforce the agreement. The court held
that public policy rendered the agreement void, stating:
The law never contemplated that persons engaged in business
as partners may incorporate, with intent to obtain the advantages
and immunities of a corporate form, and then, Proteus-like, become
at will a copartnership or a corporation . . . .They cannot be
partners inter sese and a corporation as to the rest of the world. 6
Some jurisdictions7 have adopted this doctrine; others8 have rejected it.
In Missouri there is sufficient case law supporting strict application of
the Jackson doctrine to cause stifling uncertainty. In Taylor v. Baldwin,9
a contract obligated the hospital board of directors to consult with another
party in picking the hospital administrator. Although the court held that
an agreement merely to consult was valid where the board remained free
to exercise its discretion in choosing corporate officers, it also considered
2. See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A
Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. Cm. L. R.v. 696, 701 (1960).
3. "Like the Majestic evenhandedness of French justice by which rich and
poor alike are forbidden to sleep under the bridges of Paris, strict enforcement
of the corporate norms had a somewhat one-sided application." Chayes, Madam
Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1533 (1960).
4. Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432, 433 (1956).
5. 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (Ct. Er. & App. 1910).
6. Id. at 599, 75 A. at 571.
7. See Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y.
174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948); Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944).
8. See Wabash Ry. v. American Refrig. Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir.
1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 643 (1926); Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d
354, 136 P.2d 651 (1943); Hladovec v. Paul, 222 Ill. 254, 78 N.E. 619 (1906);
Mendelsohn v. Leather Mfg. Corp., 326 Mass. 226, 93 N.E.2d 537 (1950).
9. 362 Mo. 1224, 247 S.W.2d 741 (En Banc 1952).
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the line of cases following Jackson and in dictum agreed "with the prin-
ciple stated in those cases that a contract is void which precludes a Board
of Directors from exercising its prerogative to select or change the officers
of a corporation."'1 At least two other Missouri cases contain dicta to
the same effect."
Recent statutory changes have recognized at least some of the dis-
tinctive needs of the close corporation. Typical of such changes are pro-
visions in the Missouri statutes that allow (1) a single incorporator,1 2
(2) a single director,' 3 and (3) the articles of incorporation to specify
(a) the number of shareholders necessary for a quorum at shareholders'
meetings,' 4 (b) the number of directors that constitute a quorum,'3 and
(c) the number of votes needed for director action.1
These provisions fall short of what is needed, however. It is not con-
tended that the present Missouri statutes make it impossible for share.
holders in a close corporation to fashion the management structure to their
individual needs. Legal ingenuity has in most cases found a solution.17
Nevertheless, the present statutes require such legal and logical contortions
to match the needs of the dose corporation to the corporate mold that
the law has become clouded with needless obscurity and complexity. Under
the present statutes, the most dangerous thing for the parties to do is
to sit down and make a straightforward agreement. Instead, the parties
must consult a corporate specialist to clothe their agreement in legal sub-
terfuge so it will pass statutory muster.
Therefore, the statutes are in need of further change if they are
fully to meet the needs of the close corporation. After briefly discussing
the problems of defining a "dose" corporation, this comment will examine
the further changes that are needed in the areas of shareholder voting
arrangements, management by shareholders, restrictions on alienation of
corporate shares, long-term employment contracts, dissolution and liquida-
tion, and informality of operation.
H. PROBLEMS OF DEFINING WHAT CoNsTrruTS A "CLOSE" CORPORATION
Some states' s have enacted special statutes covering only close corpora-
tions, but because of the difficulty of adequately defining the dose corpo-
ration most states have rejected this approach. 19 Any mechanical definition
10. Id. at 1245, 247 S.W.2d at 753.
11. Sante Fe Hills Golf & Country Club v. Safehi Realty Co., 349 S.W.2d
27, 34 (Mo. 1961); Leggett v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 342 S.W.2d 833, 851(Mo. En Banc 1960).
12. § 351.050, RSMo 1969.
13. § 351.315, RSMo 1969.
14. § 351.265, RSMo 1969.
15. § 351.325, RSMo 1969.
16. § 351.325, RSMo 1969.
17. See F. O'NEAI, CLOSE CoRPoArToNs (1972).
18. See DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.70-.77
(1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100-11 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEr. STAT. §§ 55-1
to -175 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1371-86 (1968).
19. For a discussion of the difficulties of defining the close corporation see
Note, Corporations-Definition of the Close Corporation, 16 VAND. L. REv. 1267
(1963). See also Folk, The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law,
15 S.C.L. R-v. 275, 282 (1963) (explaining the reasons for rejecting the separate
[Vol. 38
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will inevitably be either too narrow or too broad. The problem of defini-
don can be avoided in most cases by provisions that are theoretically
available to all corporations but that as a practical matter will be used
only by a genuine close corporation. In a few instances, however, it is
necessary to limit provisions to the "dose" corporation and to define that
term. 2 0
No definition for a close corporation can be entirely adequate. Gen-
erally, statutes have taken one of two approaches in limiting provisions
to dose corporations. Definitions have been framed in terms of (1) a
maximum number of shareholders2 1 or (2) a limitation on how the stock
is traded.2 2 The shareholder number test is arbitrary. The addition of
one more shareholder seldom changes the nature of the corporation. On
the other hand, defining a dose corporation as one whose shares are not
generally traded on the market may be equally unsatisfactory. A corpora-
tion may have a wide dispersion of share ownership, thereby losing the
characteristics of closeness, and still not be generally traded. Furthermore,
because of its inherent lack of preciseness, the "generally traded" test makes
it difficult to pinpoint exactly when a corporation crosses the line and
is no longer close.23
All things considered, the "numbers" test seems to be best. Setting a
number is not entirely arbitrary, because businessmen are influenced by
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code,24 which taxes a corporation
similarly to a partnership if among other requirements there are 10 or
fewer shareholders. The numbers test has precision and certitude that
cannot be had with the no-trade definition. The large numbers of corpo-
rations electing Subchapter S attests to the fact that the numbers test is
workable.2 5
III. SPECiFIc AREAS IN WmcH CHANGE Is NEE.D D
A. Validiy of Shareholder Voting Agreements
Almost without exception, the early cases held shareholder voting
statute in the drafting of the South Carolina statute); Hoffman, New Horizonsfor the Close Corporation in New York Under its New Business Corporation Law,
28 BRooxLyN L. REv. 1, 2 (1961).
20. See text accompanying note 34 infra and text following note 91 infra.
21. Two statutes authorize stock transfer restrictions if shares are owned
by not less than 20 shareholders. See T-x. Bus. Cor. Acr. ANN. art. 22.22 (b) (2)
(1955); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.32 (d) (1965).
22. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.70 (2) (1963); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 620(c)
(McKinney 1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (b) (1955); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-1622 (c)
(1962). The Maryland statute takes the direct approach of defining a dose corpora-
tion as one whose charter contains a statement that it is a dose corporation.
Such a statement requires 100 percent shareholder consent. MD. ANN. CODE art.
23, § 100 (a) (1967).
23. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02, n.6 (1972). The Delaware
statute solves this problem by terminating dose corporation status either 30 days
after the act causing loss of eligibility or 30 days after discovery of such an act,
whichever is later. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 348 (a), (b) (1967).
24. INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, § 1371 (a) (1).
25. In 1970, 12 percent of active American corporations (173,000 out of
1,424,000) were electing Subchapter S taxation. H. HENN, LAw OF CORPORATIONS
§ 262, at 521 n.3 (1970).
4
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agreements invalid.26 The power to vote was considered inseparable from
the ownership of the share; further, shareholders were considered to have
contracted for each other's independent and unfettered judgment at share-
holders' meetings.
A sharp change in judicial attitude came about 1910.27 Today, if
there is a proper purpose, shareholder agreements on how shares will be
voted are generally enforceable.28 The Missouri statute sanctions one device,
the voting trust, that will effect an enforceable agreement on shareholder
voting. This statute, probably the most liberal of any in the United States,
reads as follows:
Any number of shareholders of a corporation may create a voting
trust for the purpose of conferring upon a trustee or trustees the
right to vote or otherwise represent their shares, for any
period .... 29
Since the voting trust statute does not require unanimity, it is in-
compatible with the basic pattern of the close corporation. From a share-
holder's point of view, a dose corporation is similar to a partnership with
the cloak of limited liability. Shareholders in a close corporation need
the same fiduciary relationship as partners in a partnership.8 0 Each partner
owes a fiduciary duty to the other partners. 31 This fiduciary relationship
should foreclose internecine alliances in the partnership unless all partners
agree. The situation in Missouri is particularly unsatisfactory because the
Missouri statute32 lacks a disclosure requirement.8 8 A minority shareholder
may believe that he has equal rights with his other associates in management
and later find to his dismay that they have combined against him. To pro-
tect the close corporation from these divisive results, 100 percent share.
holder consent should be required for voting trusts in close corporations.8 4
26. Perry v. Missouri-Kan. Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33, 191 A. 823 (1937);
Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908); Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170, 110
N.E. 373 (1915); Lothrop v. Goudeau, 142 La. 342, 76 So. 794 (1917); Warren v.
Pim, 66 N.J. Eq. 353, 59 A. 773 (Ct. Err. Se App. 1904); Roberts v. Whitson, 188
S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). See also Annots., 45 A.L.R.2d 799, 821-23 (1956),
71 A.L.R. 1289, 1293-95 (1931).
27. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORAxrONS § 5.04 (1972).
28. See cases collected at Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 799 (1956).
29. § 351.246, RSMo 1969. This statute has yet to be judicially interpreted.
30. Some commentators suggest that a fiduciary relationship among close
corporation shareholders should be established by statute. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE
CoRPoRATIoNs § 1.14 (c); Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The
Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145, 1188 (1966). For
cases recognizing the fiduciary relationship see Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d
482, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (opinion by Circuit Judge Warren Burger); Application
of Pivot Punch & Die Corp., 15 N.Y. Misc. 2d 713, 716, 182 N.Y.S.2d 459, 463
(Sup. Ct. 1959). See also Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems and Needs
of the Close Corporation, 1969 ILL. L. FoRum 1, 6-7, where the author observes
that the effect of shareholder agreements by less than 100 percent may be minority
oppression.
31. § 351.210, RSMo 1969.
32. § 351.246, RSMo 1969.
33. See Bradley, supra note 30, at 1173 n.91, where the author questions
the wisdom of secret voting trusts even for the non-close corporations.
34. See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra for possible definitions of
"close corporation." In contrast to the close corporation situation, voting agree-
ments in large publicly held corporations can be useful with less than 100 percent
[Vol. 38
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In substance, a shareholders voting agreement and an irrevocable
proxy are indistinguishable from a voting trust. All three devices are
different methods to the same end-an enforceable contract among share-
holders. Therefore, the law should treat these three devices in the same
way. This, however, is not the case. Although the validity of the proxy
has been established by statute,35 the proxy may be revocable even though
it states the contrary, because it is viewed as creating the relationship of
principal and agent.3 6 Under the principles of agency law, however, a
proxy may be irrevocable if coupled with an interest.3 7 Pursuant to this
concept, it has been held that a proxy giving voting power as security for
a loan to the corporation is a sufficient interest to make the proxy irrevo-
cable.38 Where a proxy-holder has been induced to become a substantial
shareholder by a promise of voting control, the agreement has been held
valid.3 9 It is unsettled whether proxies given in exchange for mutual
promises among shareholders can qualify as proxies coupled with an
interest.40
The present law on irrevocable proxies is unsatisfactory because of
the uncertainity as to what type of interest will support irrevocability.
Missouri needs a statute similar to New York's,41 which removes this
uncertainty by avoiding the "coupled-with-an-interest" test. The statute
states that a proxy is irrevocable if it so states and is held by (1) a pledgee,
(2) a purchaser of the shares, (3) a creditor, (4) an officer of the corpora-
don if the proxy is conditioned on employment, or (5) parties to a voting
agreement. The evils of intramural alliances in close corporations using
irrevocable proxies coincides with the evils of a voting trust and, there-
fore, proxies should be irrevocable in close corporations only if there
is 100 percent consent.
There is no reason why a shareholder's voting agreement should have
to be cast in the form of a proxy agreement or voting trust in order to
be effective. 42 In fact, proxy agreements and voting trusts were created
as substitutes for naked voting agreements, which had met judicial opposi-
tion.4 3 The substitutes have now become well-recognized, and the "real
thing"-the simple unadorned agreement-should be given the same recogni-
tion.
consent. A group of minority shareholders with a common interest may combine
to elect a favorable director without unfair consequences.
35. § 351.245, RSMo 1969.
36. 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 550 (g) (1939).
37. Id.
38. Chapman v. Bates, 61 N.J. Eq. 658, 47 A. 638 (Ct. Err. &c App. 1900).
39. Hey v. Dolphin, 92 Hun. 230, 36 N.Y.S. 627 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
40. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRoaxrIONS § 5.11 (1971); Comment, Irrevocable
Proxies, 43 TXAs L. Rv. 733, 742-45 (1965).
41. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 609 (f) (McKinney 1963). See also S.C. CODE ANN.
8 12-16.14 (f) (5) (1962).
42. The following statutes recognize this by validating the unadorned share-
holder's agreement: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (c) (Supp. IV, 1971) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 608.75 (3) (1963); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A: 5-21 (1) (1969); N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAw § 620 (a) (McKinney 1963); N.C. G.N. STAT. § 55-73 (a) (1965); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1381-82 (Supp. 15, 1973); TEx. Bus. CoRP. Acr art. 2.30 (b) (Supp.3A, 1972).43. See Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for
More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145, 1167, 1172 (1966).
6
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B. Management by Shareholders
The provision in the Missouri statute44 that "[t]he property and
business of a corporation shall be controlled and managed by a board of
directors" is substantially identical to provisions in the vast majority of
statutes of other states.45 Courts have taken notice of the mandatory
language of the statute and have often invalidated shareholders' agree-
ments attempting to shift the management power from the board of
directors to the shareholders. 46
In Kaplan v. Block,4 7 a provision in the articles of incorporation
stated that no act of the board of directors would be valid unless ratified
by all of the shareholders. The court noted that the effect of such an
agreement was to transfer the power to manage from the board of directors
to the shareholders. Such a result, the court said, was against the public
policy expressed in the Virginia statute that the board of directors shall
manage.
It seems doubtful that such an agreement injures any state interest.
If the parties believe that some form of management structure other than
the traditional "shareholder-director-officer" scheme better serves their
needs, the interest of the state is not thereby infringed. The state has an
interest in protecting all shareholders from abuses of irresponsible man-
agement, and the best way to protect a shareholder from such abuses is
to allow him to protect himself by contractually securing the rights he
desires. Legal scholars have pointed out that an inviolate board of directors
is not intrinsically imbedded in corporate law.48 The United States Supreme
Court has stated the general rule "that except in cases where the charter
imposes a limitation the stockholders are the proper parties to take final
action in the management of corporate affairs." 49 One author has sug-
gested that statutory provisions that the board of directors shall manage
were designed merely as a concession to normal business practice, rather
than as a mandatory requirement. 50
For dose corporations a mandatory board of directors is clearly
undesirable. The parties generally regard themselves as partners. The
board of directors is no more than a paper entity to preserve the facade
of "corporateness" so that the "partners" can invoke limited liability. The
following quote illustrates the "wonderland" quality of the board of
directors:
One of the "partners" will order necessary supplies for the busi-
ness, without stopping to consider whether he has technical
authority to do so as secretary, or treasurer, or as holder of what-
ever "office" was parceled out to him to satisfy the requirements
of the corporate mold. He will tell his co-partners . . . when he
44. § 351.810, RSMo 1969.
45. See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corpo-
rate Anachronism, 27 U. Cm. L. Rv. 696, & n.1 (1960).
46. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 284 (1984). For
the Missouri position, see text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
47. 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 898 1944).
48. See Kessler, supra note 45, at 702-08.
49. Union Pac. Ry. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 168 U.S. 564, 600 (1896).
50. See Kessler, supra note 45, at 704.
[Vol. 38
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has returned, of his acts. Each will separately say "O.K., Joe,
whatever you think we need," without stopping to consider
whether the purchase requires action by the board of directors
convened as a board to authorize the contract.5 1
A few states52 have changed their statutes to allow shareholder man-
agement if the shareholders so desire. The New York statute53 provides
that the articles of incorporation may transfer the power to manage the
corporation to persons other than the board of directors if all of the
incorporators or subscribers or all of the shareholders, whether voting or
nonvoting, have authorized the provision. The provision, the existence of
which must be conspicuously noted on the share certificate, relieves the
directors of liability and imposes it on the shareholders for any acts that
the provision covers. The provision automatically lapses if the shares are
traded on a national exchange, regularly quoted over-the-counter, or sold
to persons who have no notice of the provision. Such a provision may be
removed by a vote of two-thirds or such larger proportion of shares as
may be required by the articles. Theoretically, this transfer of power is
available to all corporations, but practically only close corporations will
use it because of the unanimity requirements.
The automatic lapse provision in the New York statute is a source
of problems. One cannot be sure when shares are "regularly quoted over-
the-counter" or "traded on a national exchange." The statute could be
improved by removing any provision for automatic lapse and allowing
lapse by a two-thirds vote or at the insistence of any shareholder who
bought without notice. This assures that all parties know of the lapse and
puts them on notice that management must be revested in the board of
directors. 54
C. Restrictions on Alienation
A dose corporation is usually characterized by identity of ownership
and management, as distinguished from a publicly held corporation where
management is left to the board of directors. Because the owners of a
dose corporation may work intimately together in the daily operation of
the business, they should be free to choose their associates. 55 The ability
of shareholders to place restrictions on transferability of shares in order
to prevent transfer to incompatible persons is essential to the close corpo-
ration.
Reasonable restrictions on transfer are upheld almost everywhere.5 6
The principal problem with the "reasonable restrictions" test is its un-
certainty. The Missouri case law illustrates this uncertainty. Early Missouri
51. Id. at 717.
52. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (1967); FLA. STAT. § 608.72 (1973);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 105 (1967); N.Y. Bus. CoRP,. LAw § 620 (b) (McKinney
1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-24(b), 55-73 (b) (1965); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 14,
§ 1102(b) (1962).
53. N.Y. Bus. CoR'. LAw § 620 (b) (McKinney 1961).
54. See note 23 supra for the Delaware solution to inadvertent change of
status.
55. See Bradley, supra note 43, at 1178.
56. Painter, Stock Transfer Restrictions: Continuing Uncertainties and a
Legislative Proposal, 6 ViLL. L REV. 48 (1961).
8
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cases57 upheld agreements restraining transfer by a shareholder-creditor
of the corporation until the debt was paid. Today in Missouri, the only
other restraint with explicit judicial approval is one giving a first option
to the corporation. 5a Any deviation from these sanctioned agreements runs
the risk of being held unreasonable. Thus, associates in close corporations
enter into transfer restrictions agreements at their peril.
Some states59 have enacted statutes to remove this uncertainty. Among
the most comprehensive is the New Jersey statute.60 It provides that any
reasonable restriction on the transfer of shares may be enforced if the
restriction is in the articles, by-laws, an employee benefit plan, or a writ-
ten agreement between any number of shareholders and the corporation.
A restriction cannot be imposed upon a nonconsenting present owner, and
unless the restriction is noted conspicuously on the face of the security
it is invalid against one who becomes an owner without knowledge of its
existence. To this point the statute is an approximate restatement of
the law of Missouri and most other jurisdictions. But the New Jersey
statute goes on to remove the uncertainty found in the Missouri law
in two important ways. First, the statute enumerates five types of agree-
ments that are not unreasonable. This removes the uncertainty of the "rea-
sonable restriction" test, at least with respect to the enumerated restrictions.
Further, the statute provides that if an agreement is held to be unreasonable
the corporation shall nevertheless have an option for 30 days after the
judgment becomes final to buy the share at a price agreed upon by the
parties or, if no agreement is possible, then at a price determined by
the court.
The New Jersey statute provides for most of the needs of close corpo-
rations. It specifically allows the most common types of restraints. It
authorizes restrictions that require an offer to be made to the corporation
or to other designated persons before the stock can be sold to another.
It also authorizes a restriction that obligates a named party to buy shares
when offered, and it permits contracts that forbid transfer without the
consent of the corporation or of particular classes of security holders.
It also validates contracts that prohibit transfers to designated individuals
or classes of individuals. These provisions or combinations thereof give
the parties the same freedom to choose their business associates that is
now possible in the partnership form. Further, the comments make it
clear that the enumerated provisions are not intended to be exclusive.01
A few states62 have comprehensive statutes comparable to the New
57. See, e.g., St. Louis Perp. Ins. Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149 (1845);
Kretzer v. Cole Bros. Lighting Rod Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181 S.W. 1066 (St.
Louis Ct. App. 1916).
58. State ex ret. Huffman v. Sho-me Power Co-op., 356 Mo. 832, 204 S.W.2d
276 (En Banc 1947) (relying in part on Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § 563.15,
RSMo 1969, to validate a restriction requiring the shareholder to give a 30-day
option to the corporation before selling to another); Scruggs, Vandervoort &
Barney Bank v. International Shoe Co., 52 S.W.2d 1027 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932)(option of corporation to buy stock held valid).
59. See statutes cited notes 62 & 63 infra.
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 7-12 (1969).
61. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 7-12, Comments at 458 (1969).
62. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341 to -56 (1967); TEx. Bus. CoRP. Aar art.
2.22 (Supp. 3A, 1972); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.32 (1957).
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Jersey statute. A few other statutes suggest that some restrictions are
possible by providing that restrictions may be placed in the by-laws or
charter.63 This latter approach, however, does not deal with the uncer-
tainties of the "reasonable restriction" test. Most states,64 including Mis-
souri, make no statutory reference to the problem of restrictions on transfer.
D. Long-Term Employment Contracts
A person considering investing in a close corporation may insist
on permanent employment as a condition to his becoming a shareholder.
Shareholders often expect to devote their full time to management of
the corporation and are unwilling to invest unless they are assured of a
permanent job with participation in management. Furthermore, it is
generally the practice in close corporations to distribute a high percentage
of corporate profits as salary rather than dividends. Therefore, in order
to get a fair return on his investment a minority shareholder must be
assured of permanent employment.65
It is difficult to draft a reliable agreement guaranteeing long-term
employment. Many courts have indicated that contracts with a corporation
for employment for long or indefinite periods are invalid because they
improperly bind the hands of future boards of directors.6 6 These courts
have reasoned that because the statutes give the board of directors power
to manage the corporation and because the board is elected periodically
a new board should be able to effectuate completely new management.
Long-term employment contracts may also run afoul of corporate statutes
that allow removal of corporate officers and employees at the pleasure
of the board of directors. The Missouri statute,67 for example, states that
"any officer or agent . . . may be removed by the board of directors
whenever in its judgment the interests of the corporation would be
served . ... "
Even if a court finds that the agreement is valid there can generally
be no specific performance of employment contracts.6 8 Courts and law-
makers have wisely refused to force people into relationships requiring
mutual trust and confidence. No state has changed this policy to protect
shareholder/employees in close corporations.
While the shareholder/employee in a close corporation cannot get
complete satisfaction by specific performance, some changes can be made.
The Missouri statute provides that every corporation shall have a president
and secretary who "shall be chosen by the board of directors."69 A Missouri
63. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP,. CODE § 501 (g) (1955); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-802 (b) (1)
(1970); IowA. CODE ANN. § 496A.49 (8) (1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1613 (A)
(1967).
64. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONs § 7.06 (a) for a discussion of statutes
in this area.
65. Id. at § 6.02.
66. Borland v. John F. Sass Printing Co., 95 Colo. 53, 32 P.2d 827 (1934);
Wilson v. Jennings, 344 Mass. 608, 184 N.E.2d 642 (1962); Clifford v. Firemen's
Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, 232 App. Div. 260, 249 N.Y.S. 713 (1931), aff'd mem., 259
N.Y. 547, 182 N.E. 175 (1932).
67. § 351.365, RSMo 1969.
68. See e.g., Richardson v. Ozark Air Lines, 270 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1954).
69. § 351.360, RSMo 1969.
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case 70 suggests that the board may not bind future boards to long term
employment for officers but they may bind future boards to the long-term
employment of an employee such as a general manager. The Missouri
statute should validate employment contracts for officers as well as other
employees if all shareholders agree. Although the officer could still be
removed, his contract right would be preserved to support an action for
damages.7 '
E. Specific Performance of Shareholder Agreements
Traditionally, courts were reluctant to grant specific performance of
shareholder agreements.72 Most of the recent case law,7 3 however, supports
such relief. Professor Bradley suggests that shareholder agreements are
of little use unless specific performance is assured and that statutes should
direct courts to grant specific performance. 74 Bradley argues that such a
provision is needed to supply certainty in the law, and points out that
damages may be an entirely inadequate remedy to compensate for loss
of control of a corporation. In the absence of specific performance the
agreement may be an empty promise. Professor Chayes, 75 on the other
hand, believes that a blanket rule granting specific performance is unwise.
He considers specific performance to be judically enforced intimacy.
Specific enforcement of shareholder agreements for employment is gen-
erally denied because of the public policy against forcing unwilling parties
into consensual relationships. 76 Chayes points out that other types of
shareholder agreements may also force parties into intimate relationships
requiring mutual trust and confidence. As an example, specific enforce-
ment of a contract restricting sale of stock can force parties into con-
tinuing a relationship that may be more intimate than a mere employer-
employee relationship. The parties may work together daily in making
decisions that require a high degree of compatibility.
Thus, two legitimate policies are in conflict: (1) The policy of giving
an adequate remedy for breach of contract; and (2) the policy against
forcing parties into relationships requiring mutual trust and confidence.
A balancing of these two policies requires that, if the law forces the parties
into close quarters dictated by a shareholder's agreement, the law should
also provide an escape, in the form of dissolution, if the terms of the
agreement become intolerable. The Maryland statute77 attempts such a
balance:
A shareholder's agreement... may, in the discretion of a court
of equity, be enforced by injunction or by such other relief as the
70. Streett v. Laclede-Christy Co., 409 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1966).
71. The Missouri statute expressly provides for preservation of contract rights.
See § 351.365, RSMo 1969.
72. See 5 FrxrcHER, CYCLoPEDiA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 2067 (1967).
73. Id.
74. See Bradley, supra note 43, at 1163.
75. Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARv. L. REv.
1532 (1960).
76. Richardson v. Ozark Airlines, 270 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1954). See also F.
O'NE ii, CLOSE COaROATIONS § 6.05 n.8 (1971).
77. MD. STAT. ANN. art. 23, § 104 (d) (1973).
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court may determine to be fair and appropriate in the circum-
stances. As an alternative to the granting of an injunction or other
equitable relief, the court may upon the motion of a party to the
proceeding order the dissolution .... 78
This statute gives a court a great deal of flexibility. First, it leaves
the option of awarding only money damages for breach of the agreement,
but makes it clear that a second alternative, specific performance, is also
available. Presumably the statute incorporates the principle of equity
that specific performance is available only when damages are an insuf-
ficient remedy.79 The third option offers the greatest relief to the close
corporation shareholder. If damages are an insufficient remedy, specific
performance should be ordered, but the statute recognizes that the con-
fines of the agreement may force the parties into intolerable intimacy.
If such, is the case, the unwilling party can ask for disolution.8 0 The Mary-
land statute could be improved by making it clear that if there is a dissolu-
tion, money damages for breach of contract are available.
F. Dissolution and Liquidation
A major problem for a minority shareholder in a dose corporation
may be protecting himself in case of dissension or abuse by the majority.
In a partnership, the holder of a minority interest can use his power to
compel liquidation as a weapon against actions contrary to his interest.
Further, partners may contractually arrange the conditions and terms
of liquidation. In contrast, a minority corporate shareholder may be faced
with a statute that requires more than 50 percent shareholder consent to
effect a voluntary dissolution. This requirement, coupled with the limited
market for a minority interest in a dose corporation, leaves a minority
shareholder "locked in" and virtually powerless against majority share-
holders.8 1
The Missouri statute allows voluntary dissolution by a vote of all
the shareholders8 2 or by resolution of the board of directors and a vote
of two-thirds of the shareholders.8 3 There are no cases indicating whether
this is the exclusive means of dissolution or merely a method to operate
in the absence of a shareholders' agreement on dissolution. The weight
of authority from other jurisdictions, however, holds that a corporation
cannot be dissolved except in a manner prescribed by statute.8 4
It should be noted that a contractual dissolution can probably be
arranged in Missouri by ingenious counsel. The parties can agree that
78. Involuntary dissolutions are governed by MD. STAT. ANN. art. 23, § 109
(1973). See text accompanying note 92 infra.
79. H. McCLINTOCK, PRINCIPI S Or EQurry § 60 (2d ed. 1948).
80. Under the Maryland statute the court may decree dissolution if "[there
is such internal dissension among the stockholders of the corporation that the
affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the
stockholders generally." MD. STAT. ANN. art. 23, § 109 (1973).
81. See Comment, Rights of the Minority Shareholders to Dissolve the Closely
Held Corporation, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 514, 516-17 (1955).
82. § 351.460, RSMo 1969.
83. § 351.465, RSMo 1969.
84. See 16a FrzxrcmR, CYCLoPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 8013 (1962).
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the trustee of a voting trust shall vote for dissolution upon the occurrence
of an agreed event.8 5 Because there are no Missouri cases, this method
is unreliable for planning purposes; it is open to the challenge that it
conflicts with the statutory norm. An agreement among shareholders that
the trustee of a voting trust shall liquidate and distribute the assets (leav-
ing an empty corporate shell) upon a stated contingency is also probably
valid, but again the validity is uncertain because it may run afoul of
the "director shall manage" mandate.8 6 Buy out provisions may also give
some protection to an oppressed minority. The disadvantage of this device
is that a shareholder with ready assets may provoke dissension to force
the minority to use their sellout option.8 7 The result is that in Missouri
the minority shareholder has no satisfactory protection against abuse by
the majority.
Several states8s have enacted statutes that allow shareholders to pro-
vide for contractual dissolution. The New Jersey statute reads:
The certificate of incorporation may provide that any shareholder,
or any specified number of shareholders ... may effect the dissolu-
tion of the corporation at will or upon the occurrence of a specified
event.8 9
The statute also deals with the vote required for amendments adding or
deleting such a provision and the problems of notice of the provision
to subsequent purchasers. This type of statute would remove the uncer-
tainties in the present Missouri law. Because such contracts providing for
dissolution require consent of all shareholders, their use is practically
limited to close corporations.
A more liberal statute on involuntary liquidation is also needed in
Missouri for the minority shareholder who fails to protect himself by
contractual dissolution.9 0 The present Missouri statute91 gives equity
courts power to liquidate the assets of the corporation upon suit by a
shareholder when it appears (a) that there is a deadlock in the manage-
ment and that irreparable injury is being suffered or threatened thereby,
or (b) the acts of those in control are illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent,
or (c) the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted. While these
limited grounds for involuntary liquidation provide stability for the
publicly held corporation, they can be a serious obstacle for the minority
shareholder in a closely held corporation. Even though there is no oppres-
sion, no deadlock, and no waste, the minority shareholder may find his
situation entirely unsatisfactory. The atmosphere of trust and confidence
that accompanied the launch of their venture may have completely dissi-
85. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.06 (1971).
86. See text accompanying notes 44 & 45 supra.
87. See F. O'NEL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.05 (1972).
88. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (a) (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-5
(1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1002 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
55-125 (3) (1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-2214 (1962).
89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-5 (1969).
90. For a good discussion on the need for self-executing protection for the
minority shareholder see Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs
of the Close Corporation, 1969 ILL. L. FoRum 1, 15.
91. § 351.485, RSMo 1969.
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pated and been replaced by open hostility. In such a situation, the minority
shareholder should be able to withdraw his investment through an in-
voluntary liquidation.
An example of the statutes designed to allow this is the Maryland
statute.92 It allows dissolution of a dose corporation on the ground that
"there is such internal dissention among the stockholders of the corpora-
don that the affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to
the advantage of the stockholders generally." The statute further provides
that if any of the shareholders wish to continue the business they may
avoid dissolution by purchasing the stock of the petitioner at its fair
value. To maintain the stability of the non-dose corporation, this pro-
vision should be available only to the dose corporation.
G. Informality of Operation
According to traditional corporation doctrine, neither directors nor
shareholders may act except at duly called meetings that conform to
statutory standards of formality. 93 The Missouri statute94 is fairly liberal
in allowing informality at directors' meetings. It allows the by-laws to
specify the type of notice required, provides that attendance at a meeting
constitutes a waiver of notice, and provides that written consent in advance
to any action to be taken by the board constitutes valid board action. The
Missouri statutes95 on shareholders meetings are more rigid, however. For
example, written notice of each shareholders' meeting, stating the day,
hour, and purpose must be given to each shareholder not more than 50
days or less than 10 days before the meeting.96 In addition, notice must
be published. 97
These statutory formalities are often ignored in close corporations.
98
The shareholders may work together daily and have general knowledge
of what actions are being taken. If a shareholder disagrees with actions
to be taken, he usually has an opportunity to object. The parties may
wish to spend little time on paper work and may justifiably feel that such
a formality is unnecessary to protect an owner who is intimately involved
in management. 99
A disregard of these formalities, however, may lead to serious legal
consequences. If a court finds that the corporate entity was a mere conduit
for the shareholders to transact their own affairs, it may disregard the
corporate entity if necessary to do justice.100 Disregard of the corporate
92. MD. STAT. ANN. art. 23, § 109 (Supp. 2, 1971).
93. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 44, 170 (Rev. ed. 1946).
94. § 351.340, RSMo 1969.
95. See generally §§ 351.225-235, RSMo 1969.
96. § 351.230 (1), RSMo 1969.
97. § 351.230 (2), RSMo 1969.
98. It should be noted that the close corporation has the same need for com-
plete and accurate financial records as a larger corporation. The cumbersome
machinery necessary for valid corporate action, however, is inappropriate for the
dose corporation.
99. See e.g., Silverman v. Gilbert, 185 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 1966) (by-laws were
never adopted).
100. See 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§§ 41-44 (1963).
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entity may result in loss of limited liability, which may be the primary
purpose for organizing the corporation1 01
The North Carolina Corporation Act 02 contains detailed provisions
designed for close corporations. Acts taken by a majority of directors or
a majority of the members of a committee without a meeting are never-
theless valid if (1) all directors or members of the committee consent in
writing either before or after 03 the action, or (2) all shareholders know
of the action and make no prompt objection, or (3) the directors or
committee members are accustomed to informal action, the custom is
generally known to the shareholders, 04 and prompt objection to the
informal action is not made by a director or committee member.105
The North Carolina act has similar provisions for informal share-
holder action. The statute106 provides that any meeting of shareholders
is valid, however called and with whatever notice, if (1) all shareholders
are present in person or by proxy and no objection to holding the meet-
ing is made, or (2) a quorum is present in person or by proxy and all
absent shareholders sign a written waiver of notice or consent to the
action taken, or (3) all parties entitled to vote consent in writing to
action taken without a meeting either before or after the action. While
the informal proceedings are theoretically available to all corporations,
they will practically be available only to close corporations because of
the requirement that all shareholders manifest consent.
IV. CONCLUSION
The above changes to the Missouri statute should enable the owners
of a close corporation to structure it according to their needs. The primary
vehicle to allow this structural freedom is the shareholder's agreement.
If the shareholder's agreement is freed from the shackles of the "corporate
norm," the parties can decide how their corporation will be managed
and embody their decision in an enforceable contract. The most trouble-
some of the "corporate norms" is the slavish service to the statutory pro-
vision that the "directors shall manage." The statute should make it clear
that the close corporation can be free of the "shareholder-director-officer"
management structure and that its management can be contractually
structured.
101. Id.
102. N.C. GFN. STAT. §§ 55-1 to -175 (1965). Other statutes designed to give
relief to the close corporation are: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7201-16 (Supp. 1972);
TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 9.09 (1956); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-27 (1973).
103. In Missouri, it appears that written consent is a substitute for a meeting
only if made before the action is taken:
If all the directors ... consent in writing to any action to be taken by
the directors, such consent shall have the same force and affect as a unan-
mous vote of the directors at a meeting duly held ... § 351.340 (2), RSMo
1969 (emphasis added).
There are no cases interpreting this provision.
104. A 1959 amendment substituted "generally known to shareholders" for
"known to all shareholders." This amendment could allow informal action for
relatively large corporations and has potential for abuse.
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-29 (1965).
106. N.C. GmI4. STAT. § 55-63 (1965).
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